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I
INTRODUCTION
America can be justifiably proud of the enormous strides its legal system
has made since the end of World War II in identifying and vindicating equality
rights under the U.S. Constitution. The 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,' striking down the separate-but-equal doctrine in public education,
provided the inspiration and the doctrinal basis 2 for racial minorities, women,
aliens, children born out of wedlock, the disabled, and the poor to pursue
their claims for evenhanded treatment in the courts. 3 We also have seen
greater judicial protection of equality in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the first amendment to the Constitution, such as freedom of religion, speech,
and the press. 4 For all this progress, however, the Supreme Court has over
the last two decades embraced "doctrines of limitation" that severely
constrain the ability of equality claims to get a judicial hearing and to receive
vindication. These doctrines raise serious questions as to whether the federal
court system can be looked to in the future for meaningful protection of
equality rights. It is to a brief discussion of a few of these doctrines-state
action, discriminatory intent, and federalism-that I would like to turn.
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1. 347 US 483 (1954).
2. The principle that racial classifications are inherently suspect and so warrant the strictest
constitutional scrutiny had, of course, been articulated prior to Brown. See United States v Carolene
Products Co., 304 US 144, 152 n4 (1938); Korematsu v United States, 323 US 214 (1944). It was only in
Brown, however, that the promise of footnote four was realized in a decision invalidating state-
imposed racial segregation. See generally Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 622-42 (Foundation
Press, lIth ed 1985).
3. See White v Register, 412 US 755 (1973) (reapportionment plan adversely affecting voting
rights of African-Americans and Mexican-Americans); Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677 (1973) (job
benefits disfavoring women employees); Bernal v Fainter, 467 US 216 (1984) (alienage/citizenship
requirements to become a notary); Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762 (1977) (inheritance rights of
illegitimate children); City of Cleburne, Texas v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432 (1985) (zoning
ordinance excluding group home for mentally retarded); Harper v Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US 663
(1966) (poll tax that disenfranchised the poor).
4. See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981) (religion); Police Department of Chicago v Mosely, 408
US 92 (1972) (speech); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 US 575 (1983)
(press).
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GOVERNMENTAL OR STATE ACTION
A. State Action
The first doctrine of limitation is that of governmental or state action. By
reading beyond the Preamble to the Constitution, one learns that both the
protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights and the bar against denial of the
equal protection of the laws in the fourteenth amendment are directed at
limiting governmental, not private, action. Moreover, it should be apparent
that without the recognition of a distinction between the public and private
spheres in our society, equally important personal rights, such as the right to
equal protection and the freedom of intimate association, would be brought
frequently and unavoidably into conflict. Failure to recognize separate public
and private spheres would also undermine the fundamental distinction drawn
between government activity and private enterprise in our capitalist economy.
Concerns about the severe limitations that the governmental action
doctrine imposes upon claims of equality do not stem from a desire to bring
those conflicts about. Rather, they arise for three other reasons. First, the
Supreme Court has adopted an increasingly narrow definition of what
constitutes governmental action. Second, the Court has continued to leave
ambiguous Congress's ability to reach nongovernmental denials of equal
treatment under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Third, the Court
has brought a troubling flexibility in recent years to its definition of the term
"state" in the fourteenth amendment.
1. Government-Private Enterprise Interdependence. It is theoretically possible to
identify polar situations where one can say with confidence that only private
behavior is involved or that governmental action is clearly present. But it is
difficult to locate on the continuum between the two poles where the equal
protection clause should have no bearing and where the clause ought to have
force. In our highly complex society, business enterprises that would surely
have been viewed at an earlier time in our history as quintessentially private
are now heavily regulated by government. Government has also looked
increasingly to private entities to perform public functions that it might have
to discharge otherwise. 5 This interdependency should make their actions
prime candidates for equal protection analysis.
However, the Court has gradually, but firmly, moved away from
precedents developed beginning in the 1950s that placed great significance
upon the fact of government-private enterprise interdependence. 6 The values
5. See, for exampleJackson v Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US 345 (1974) (provision of electric
power by privately owned but highly regulated utility not viewed as state action).
6. Cases such as Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961), and Reitman v Mulkey,
387 US 369 (1967), represent the high-water mark of state action doctrine. Beginning with Moose
Lodge v lrvis, 407 US 163 (1972), the Supreme Court over the course of the 1970s and 1980s
retreated from Reitman's expansive view of state action. Recently, however, there has been a curious
resurgence of state action doctrine in cases concerning the applicability of constitutional limits to the
[Vol. 55: No. I
DIMENSIONS OF EQUALITY
underlying the Court's inclination to draw the line in a way that insulates
denials of equality from constitutional scrutiny have not been made entirely
clear.7 But there seems to be at least an implicit belief that the free enterprise
system would be put at risk by a contrary ruling8
2. Courts and Private Disputes. One exercise in line-drawing that the Court
had to confront in the late 1940s was whether private action must pass
constitutional muster when an individual invokes the state's judicial
machinery to resolve a private dispute. In a still much-debated ruling,9 the
Court held that a state court's enforcement of a restrictive covenant
agreement between private parties added state action to racial discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause, even though the discriminatory
agreement itself was not prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.' 0 That
decision raised questions about, among other things, whether the Court's
view of governmental action would work against the willingness of private
parties to resolve their differences in court rather than to resort to what might
be socially unacceptable self-help.
Many thought that further guidance on the scope of this view of
governmental action would be forthcoming from the Court's review of
criminal trespass convictions of civil rights sit-in demonstrators in the
1960s.11 At issue was whether enforcement by local police of racially
discriminatory practices by privately owned places of public accommodation
constituted an equal protection violation. In other words, did the government
become a partner in the discriminatory acts? As a consequence of certain
changes in state law and passage of the public accommodations provisions of
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 however, the central constitutional
question was left unanswered. As a result, no resolution was reached with
respect to what values should determine the location of the governmental
use of peremptory challenges in jury selection. See Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co., Il1 S Ct 2077
(1991) (use of peremptory challenge to remove jury candidates by private civil litigant constitutes
state action and so may not be exercised in discriminatory fashion); Georgia v McCollum, 261 Ga 473,
405 SE2d 688 (discriminatory use of peremptory challenge by criminal defendant permitted), cert
granted, 112 S Ct 370 (1991).
7. See, for example, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v US Olympic Committee, 483 US 522, 542-
47 (1987) (no governmental action in special congressional grant of expansive trademark protection
and partial funding); id at 548-60 (Brennan dissenting).
8. See generally Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U Pa L Rev 1289 (1982).
9. Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948).
10. For sources on the scholarly debate over the correctness of Shelley, see Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1, 29-31 (1959); Louis H. Pollak, Racial
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U Pa L Rev 1, 6 (1959); Louis
Henkin, Shelley v Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U Pa L Rev 473 (1962).
11. Bell v Maryland, 378 US 226 (1964). Justice Douglas's opinion, while concurring in the
dismissal of the trespass charges in Bell, confronted the state action problem head-on, urging that the
Court reach the merits and, applying Shelley's logic, dismiss the indictments. Id at 252-60. However,
Justice Brennan's Opinion of the Court went to great lengths to duck the issue. Id at 241-42. See
Drew S. Days III,Justice William 0. Douglas and Civil Rights, in Stephen L. Washy, ed, He Shall Not Pass
This Way Again: The Legacy of Justice William 0. Douglas 109, 112-13 (U Pittsburgh for William 0.
Douglas Inst, 1990).
12. Title II, 42 USC §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988). See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States,
379 US 241 (1964) (sustaining constitutionality of Title II).
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action line in this situation. In subsequent cases involving various forms of
licensing or regulation, the Court has generally not found the requisite level
of state involvement.' 3
B. Reach of the Enabling Clause
Questions about the ability of Congress to reach private action through
section 5, the enabling clause, of the fourteenth amendment have been with
us since 1883. In that year, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited, among other things, racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation.' 4 It determined that
Congress's power to legislate pursuant to section 5 was limited to addressing
only governmental, not private, racial discrimination. The Court's conclusion
in this regard was not preordained, to say the least.' 5 Nevertheless, this
narrow view of section 5 has constrained Congress to invoke other sources of
authority, in addition to section 5, to legislate against private acts of
discrimination, and the Court has not seen fit to question seriously the narrow
view's continued vitality. Consequently, when enacting the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress took
great pains to invoke its commerce power, as well as section 5, as authority.' 6
In a challenge to the constitutionality of those provisions, the Court found the
commerce power authority sufficient and declined to reach the section 5
question. 17
C. Partitioned Concept of State
One would think that few difficulties of line-drawing would arise where
governmental action was found. However, the Court has defined the term
"state," as it is used in the fourteenth amendment, in a way that makes
application of the equal protection doctrine less than straightforward. In
1974, for example, the Court held that lower courts erred in ordering a school
desegregation plan that encompassed Detroit and a number of its adjoining
suburbs.' 8 The record of action by state authorities to create and perpetuate
13. See, for example, Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991 (1982); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 US 163 (1972).
Moose Lodge held that a racially discriminatory private club's exercise of a state-granted liquor license
did not constitute state action sufficient to subject the club's activities to constitutional limitations. Id
at 177. In a secondary holding, the Moose Lodge Court ruled that a Pennsylvania regulation requiring
private clubs to abide by their own internal rules constituted state action and so would be
unconstitutional insofar as the internal rules sought to be so enforced were themselves
discriminatory. Id at 177-79. However, there are no reported post-Moose Lodge cases involving such
state attempts to enforce discriminatory club rules.
14. Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883).
15. See, for example, United States v Guest, 383 US 745 (1966), where six justices concluded, in
separate opinions by Justices Clark at 762 and Brennan at 782 not attracting a majority, that § 5
empowered Congress to reach purely private conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of 14th
amendment rights; Lawrence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 350-53 (Foundation Press, 2d ed
1988).
16. 42 USC §§ 2000a et seq. See also Gunther, Constitutional Law at 158-64 (cited in note 2)
(excerpts of Senate hearings).
17. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 US 241.
18. Milliken v Bradley, 418 US 717 (1974).
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racial segregation in Detroit was clear. But the Court decreed that the
surrounding suburbs could not be included in a plan to remedy the state's
fourteenth amendment violation unless it could be shown that the suburbs
themselves engaged in segregative acts that affected the racial composition of
Detroit schools. Although for many other legal and constitutional purposes
municipalities are mere creatures of the state, the Court concluded that a
tradition of local school district autonomy required them to be treated as
independent actors. Under this compartmentalized view of state action,
violations of constitutional rights may go effectively unremedied. 19
III
PURPOSE OR INTENT TO DISCRIMINATE
A. Intent Becomes an Indispensable Element
The second limiting doctrine requires that there be, in addition to the
presence of a governmental or state actor, a purpose or intent to deny equal
protection of the laws. It was not until 1976, in a challenge to a police
department employment testing program on the ground that it was racially
discriminatory, that the Supreme Court held explicitly that purpose or intent
to discriminate was an indispensable element of a constitutional case.20 The
form of the announcement was rather matter of fact. In truth, however, lower
federal courts had decided numerous cases premised on their implicit
understanding that certain types of harmful governmental action violated the
Constitution, whether intended or not.21 A contributing factor to what the
Court described as a misunderstanding by lower courts of its precedents was
that many of its prior decisions had dealt with overt racial classifications.
Hence, there had been no need to address the question of what standard
would be required in other contexts.
Not surprisingly, given the difficulty of establishing the intent of just one
person, this requirement has proven to be a formidable obstacle in redressing
governmental conduct that results in inequality along the lines of race,
gender, economic status, 22 class, or other grounds. When confronted with
19. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Drew S. Days III, School Desegregation Law in the
1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing?, 95 Yale LJ 1737, 1753-64 (1986) (book review).
20. Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239 (1976). The intent standard does not pertain, however,
to statutory claims brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq
(1988). See Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424, 432 (1971). In response to what Congress felt was a
retrenchment by the Supreme Court with respect to Griggs in Wards Cove v Atonio, 490 US 642 (1989),
it recently amended Title VII to codify the Griggs standard. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No
102-166, 105 Stat 1071 (1991), to be codified in part at 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq.
21. See Washington v Davis, 426 US at 244 n12 (gathering cases).
22. Even if Washington v Davis were reversed, there would still exist other significant obstacles to
an equal protection challenge to economic discrimination. Chief among these is the fact that
economic discrimination is subject only to rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
See Jefferson v Hackney, 406 US 535, 546 (1972); see also James v Valtierra, 402 US 137 (1971). More
recent cases, however, evince a willingness by the Supreme Court to engage at times in a more
searching variant of rationality review. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432,
447-50 (1985). This type of heightened scrutiny would be particularly appropriate where the
challenged practice causes a disproportionate adverse impact to racial minorities.
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the task of establishing requisite discriminatory intent behind the actions over
many years of numerous government actors, the burden quickly becomes
impossible to bear.23
Clearly, in view of the stratification of American society along economic
and racial lines, government programs might be expected inevitably to have
some disparate impact. There is reason to be concerned, therefore, about a
rule that would take such disparate or disproportionate impact as conclusive
evidence of a constitutional violation. But no one has argued seriously for
such an approach. Even requiring government to provide a federal court with
satisfactory explanations for every policy having a disparate impact would be
difficult to defend. On the other hand, the current requirement that
discriminatory intent be shown means that the courts must accord
extraordinary deference to government programs and policies that produce
particularly severe consequences for some of the least fortunate and most
defenseless groups in society with respect to things that really matter: food,
housing, health care, and education.
Were America a country without a shameful history of overt, systematic
discrimination against some of these same groups, we might be justified in
resisting any call for government to explain itself. Since that is not the case,
asking government to defend its policies, including its decision to reject more
evenhanded and equally effective measures, accords more with the spirit of
the equal protection clause than does the current rule. Such an approach
would not mean that the courts would necessarily reject the government's
policy decisions, just that reasons would have to be given.
A 1987 decision by the Court underscores the importance of the intent
requirement as a "doctrine of limitation."2 4 A black man, convicted of
murder and sentenced to death for killing a white person, established
statistically that black defendants who kill white victims have a significantly
greater likelihood of being sentenced to death than either white defendants
who kill white victims or defendants of either race who kill blacks. The
Supreme Court rejected his claim that the statistics raised valid equal
23. For example, in Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 68-70 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a
showing of discriminatory intent was necessary to establish unconstitutional vote dilution. Although
on remand the Bolden plaintiffs ultimately succeeded in demonstrating the requisite discriminatory
intent, the expenses incurred in making that showing were extraordinary. As a consequence of the
intent requirement, only persons with access to substantial financial and institutional resources could
hope to win vindication of their constitutional rights. See generally Peyton McCrary, History in the
Courts: The Significance of Bolden v. The City of Mobile, in Chandler Davidson, ed, Minority Vote
Dilution 47, 59 (Howard U Press, 1984).
Ironically, just shortly after Congress had acted to restore the effects test through a statutory
prohibition, 1982 Voting Rights Amendments, Pub L No 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat 131 (1982), codified at
42 USC §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973aa-6 (1988), the Court found in another case of alleged racially
discriminatory redistricting that the Bolden test can indeed be satisfied by inferring the requisite
intent from discriminatory effects. See Rogers v Lodge, 458 US 613, 623-24 (1982).
McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279 (1987), established a similarly prohibitive burden for prisoner
challenges to the racist manner in which prosecutorial systems are administered in many
jurisdictions. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text; see also Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v.
Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 Harv L Rev 1388 (1988).
24. McCleskey, 481 US 279.
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protection issues because he was unable to establish that the pattern was
intentional. 25 The state was spared, consequently, the burden of explaining
its reasons for operating a criminal justice system that produced such racially
skewed results. Against Georgia's undeniable history of overt, explicit
discrimination against African-Americans, 26 it is difficult to square the Court's
results with one of the central purposes the equal protection clause was
designed to serve, namely, the shielding of blacks from hostile, racially
motivated governmental practices.
B. "Invidious" Not "But-For" Intent
The foregoing description suggests that the equal protection claimant has
carried his or her evidentiary burden once intent to discriminate has been
established. That assumption would be incorrect, for there are, in the
Supreme Court's view, degrees of intent. Unlike the familiar rule of tort law-
that one is presumed to have intended the natural and foreseeable
consequences of one's, acts-under our constitutional doctrine, the
government is not necessarily liable for the natural and foreseeable
consequences of its acts.
According to the Court, where government pursues a legitimate goal of
assisting one group, even if the natural and foreseeable consequence is to
disadvantage another, the requisite intent upon which to base an equal
protection claim is not present. Captured in the phrases "but for" 'and "in
spite of," discriminatory intent is present where government would not have
pursued a particular course of conduct "but for" its knowledge of the
disparate consequences; acting to achieve other legitimate ends "in spite of"
knowledge of collateral disproportionate impact does not demonstrate the
required invidious intent. Faithful to this standard, the Court concluded that
a Massachusetts veterans' preference law with an especially disproportionate
impact upon women passed constitutional muster, even though the
consequences were foreseeable to the legislature and alternative ways of
assisting veterans with less disparate impact were available. 27 Here, as in the
Georgia death penalty case, the Court embraced a categorical rule in the face
of reasons to wonder whether the Massachusetts policy was not another
manifestation of group antagonism, in this case outmoded views of the role of
women in society. 28
25. Id at 298-99.
26. See Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 UC Davis L Rev
1327 (1985); David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Monitoring and
Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 UC Davis L Rev 1375 (1985);
Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law (Columbia U Press, 1959).
27. Personnel Administrator of Mlassachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256 (1979). A variety of less
discriminatory alternatives was outlined in John H. Fleming & Charles A. Shanor, Veterans' Preferences
in Public Employment: Unconstitutional Gender Discrimination?, 26 Emory LJ 13, 50-52 (1977).
28. Such bias is evidenced, among other places, in the fact that until 1971 the Massachusetts
statute and implementing regulations exempted from the preference job categories "especially
calling for women." See Feeney, 442 US at 284-85 (Marshall dissenting).
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IV
FEDERALISM
The third and final doctrine I want to discuss is federalism. America
fought a Civil War over slavery and the future of the Union. In its aftermath,
three amendments were added to the Constitution, and Congress enacted
numerous statutes designed to enforce the protections of individual rights
guaranteed by those amendments. 29 For the first time in our history, the
states found themselves subject to constraints upon their treatment of
persons within their jurisdiction like those that the Bill of Rights already had
imposed upon the federal government. 30 Additionally, federal courts were
given plenary jurisdiction for the first time to entertain cases and
controversies arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States. 3'
A. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Reconstruction era produced a new order among the federal
government, the several states, and the people. That new order was designed
to place the federal government in a special role of ensuring that citizens of
the United States enjoyed equal status free from attempts by the states to
dictate otherwise. One textual basis for that view was the privileges and
immunities clause which precedes the equal protection clause in the
fourteenth amendment. It reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." 32 It offered at least the possibility that certain rights that civilized and
democratic societies had come to associate with citizenship would be available
uniformly throughout the land.
Had this reading been adopted by the Court, much of the law laboriously
and belatedly developed under the equal protection clause of the same
amendment might have been unnecessary. Unfortunately, in its earliest
construction of the Civil War amendments,33 the Court reduced the privileges
29. In brief, the 13th amendment (1865) emancipated black slaves, the 14th amendment (1868)
granted them citizenship, and the 15th amendment (1870) prohibited discrimination against the
newly freed slaves on the basis of race or previous enslavement. During the period between 1866
and 1875, Congress enacted a number of statutes aimed at implementing these amendments, the
most important of which are now codified at 42 USC §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985.
30. For a summary of the federal legislation policy for this period, see Mitchum v Foster, 407 US
225, 238-44 (1972).
31. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, ch 137, 18 (part 3) Stat 470 (1875) (granting original cognizance,
concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all civil suits, where the matter in dispute exceeds
five hundred dollars "and arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority .. "). Federal question jurisdiction is currently
codified at 28 USC § 1331 (1988) and no longer requires a minimum amount in controversy.
Federal jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional state court proceedings was also conferred at this
time by 42 USC § 1983, which was interpreted as falling under the statutory exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 USC § 2283 (1988). The Anti-Injunction Act otherwise imposes a blanket
prohibition against such suits. See Mitchum v Foster, 407 US at 242-43.
32. US Const, Amend XIV, § 1, cl 2.
33. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 US 36, 75 (1872).
[Vol. 55: No. I
DIMENSIONS OF EQUALITY
and immunities clause to a redundancy, finding that no greater role was
envisioned for the federal government than already existed under a similar
provision in Article IV of the Constitution. 34 That role, said the Court, was to
ensure that states did not interfere with the special relationship citizens had
with the federal government, such as the right to vote in federal elections.
The status of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment has remained essentially unaltered since the early 1870s. One
would be justified in concluding that this is so because the Court continues to
embrace a view of federalism that minimizes the transformative effect that the
Civil War amendments were designed to produce in the pre-war relationship
between the federal government and the states.
B. Eleventh Amendment
In sharp contrast to the Court's unwillingness to read anything meaningful
in the language of the privileges and immunities clause, it has given the
eleventh amendment increasingly broad interpretations that find no basis in
its actual wording. That amendment imposes limits on federal court
jurisdiction to entertain certain types of suits brought against states. For
example, it prohibits suits against states by citizens of another state. It has
been read by the Court, however, to preclude suits in federal courts brought
against states by their own citizens. 35
Recognizing the difficulty of interpreting the eleventh amendment in a way
that would bar suits in federal courts under the equal protection clause, the
prohibitions of which speak explicitly to the states, the Court has constructed
an elaborate set of doctrines to avoid that anomaly.3 6 Nevertheless, the
eleventh amendment continues to be an obstacle to effective prosecution of
equal protection claims in federal court, particularly with respect to
retrospective relief. Though the Court has acknowledged recently Congress's
power to enact legislative overrides of the eleventh amendment bar,37 every
day of delay before all federal laws are revised to show an intent to override
the bar to suit means that some meritorious claims of equal protection denial
will be extinguished.
34. US Const, Art IV, § 2.
35. Hans v Louisiana, 134 US I (1890). See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v Halderman
(Pennhurst II), 465 US 89, 121 (1984) (federal courts exercising pendent jurisdiction may not enforce
state law claims against state defendants); Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 242 (1985)
(congressional intent to abrogate statutorily states' 11 th amendment immunity from suit must be
stated explicitly). But see Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445, 456 (1976) (finding congressional intent to
abrogate 11 th amendment immunity under Title VII and noting that the I Ith amendment is less of a
hurdle for legislation passed pursuant to § 5 of the 14th amendment); Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.,
491 US 1 (1989) (same under CERCLA).
36. See, for example, the doctrine announced in Ex Parte Young, 209 US 123 (1908), which allows
suits for equitable relief against state officers for unconstitutional conduct. See also Edelman vjordan,
415 US 651, 664 (1974) (though 1 th amendment bars retrospective compensation for damages,
prospective injunctive relief against states is available); Monell v Department of Social Services of.Vew York
City, 436 US 658, 690 n54 (1978) (political subdivisions of states such as counties, municipalities, and
school boards not protected by 11 th amendment).
37. Penns lvania v Union Gas Co., 491 US 1, 13-17 (1989).
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V
CONCLUSION
One should not come away from my recitation despondent over the state
of equal protection guarantees under the Constitution. Cases are won every
day, and rights are vindicated. But we should keep in mind, first, that the
doctrines I have described above are serious barriers to obtaining redress for
equality violations; and, second, that these doctrines need not last forever, but
represent, rather, only choices among competing alternatives. Some of the
alternatives not chosen appear more deserving of the Court's endorsement
than the doctrines now in place. These alternative interpretations may one
day prove persuasive to a majority of the Court.
